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THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Kermit Roosevelt III* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation with race-based 
affirmative action, Fisher v. University of Texas,1 did not live up to peo-
ple’s expectations—or their fears.  The Court did not explicitly 
change the current approach in any substantial way.  It did, however, 
signal that it wants race-based affirmative action to be subject to real 
strict scrutiny, not the watered-down version featured in Grutter v. Bol-
linger.2  That is a significant signal, because under real strict scrutiny, 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  This Article is based on remarks 
delivered at the Journal of Constitutional Law’s annual Symposium, January 24, 2014.  I 
thank the participants in that Symposium for their helpful comments, and the editors of 
the Journal of Constitutional Law for their assistance in the preparation of the Article. 
1  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).  More recently, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
134 S.Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014), the Court considered the constitutionality of a state-level 
constitutional amendment banning the use of race (and sex, although there does not 
seem to be any evidence that sex-based preferences were used or considered by the 
relevant schools) in admissions at public institutions of higher education.  That case 
turned on the political process doctrine created in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969),  and Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 485 U.S. 457 (1982), not the 
constitutional status of affirmative action.  Several Justices did, however, find occasion to 
discuss the merits of affirmative action on its own, and I will mention those discussions 
when relevant. 
 2 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  In Grutter, oddly, the Court announced that it would defer to the 
judgment of the University of Michigan Law School as to whether racial diversity was 
necessary to its educational mission.  Id. at 329.  This was odd because deference and 
strict scrutiny are normally incompatible.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 744 (2007) (stating that “deference ‘is 
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence . . .’” (quoting Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005))).  Indeed, considering a similar issue under the 
intermediate scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications, the Supreme Court flatly 
rejected the Virginia Military Institute’s contention that its adversative method could not 
be offered to both sexes.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540–43 (1996).  By 
signaling that strict scrutiny would now operate differently than it had in Grutter, Fisher 
sent the same message that Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), did in the abortion 
context:  the law may not have changed, but there’s a new sheriff in town.  What 
distinguishes Fisher from Grutter is the same thing that distinguishes Gonzales from the 
prior (and irreconcilable) partial birth abortion case, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000).  It is that Justice Samuel Alito has replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  For an 
analysis of the consequences of this replacement, see Kermit Roosevelt, The Centrist 
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almost all race-based affirmative action programs are likely unconsti-
tutional.3  This is especially true given the conceptual framework the 
Court has created for such programs—the way the Court has set up 
the constitutional analysis. 
On the other hand, the Court’s conceptual framework is wildly, 
almost absurdly, wrong.  This Article will discuss the way the Court 
has set up the constitutional analysis of affirmative action and why it 
is wrong.  It will do so in the form of a list—a list of the propositions 
we must accept if we are to take the Court’s affirmative action juris-
prudence at face value.  Some of these are things that the Court has 
said explicitly, and others are inferences I feel it is fair to draw.  Not 
all of them command majority support, and when they do not, I note 
that.  Some of them, I hope, bear their absurdity on their face; for 
others, I offer some explanation of why I think they do not make 
sense.  In all, I hope this list supports the assessment I give my first-
year constitutional law students:  of all the areas of the Court’s juris-
prudence we cover in our survey of constitutional law, the handling 
of race-based affirmative action is the least defensible. 
I.  A MARGINALLY BETTER EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE OUTWEIGHS 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Which is more important:  education or the Constitution?  Teach-
ers everywhere (except perhaps teachers of constitutional law) should 
be delighted to learn that the Supreme Court believes that increasing 
the quality of the educational experience is a sufficiently important 
 
Cannot Hold, AM. PROSPECT July 5, 2005, http://prospect.org/article/centrist-cannot-
hold. 
 3 This is so because there usually will be some means other than explicit consideration of 
race that will produce the desired diversity.  See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (emphasizing 
that narrow tailoring “requires that the reviewing court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a  
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity” and highlighting 
the consequent need to examine race-neutral alternatives).  Whether a facially race-
neutral admissions device employed with the intention of producing a particular racial 
composition of the student body should in fact be treated differently from an explicit 
racial classification is a separate issue.  Justice Anthony Kennedy has suggested that such 
an approach would not “demand strict scrutiny.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  That seems odd, since the Court has clearly held that such 
devices are equivalent to explicit classifications when used to exclude minorities or resist 
desegregation.  See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  It makes some sense 
given the Court’s increasing focus on mere classification as the evil to be avoided, and 
particularly with respect to Justice Kennedy’s concern about government imposition of a 
racial identity that may not match the one an individual assigns herself.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 89–90.  (This last concern, however, could also presumably be 
addressed simply by not identifying the beneficiaries of a classification.) 
Feb. 2015] THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 731 
 
government interest that it can be invoked to meet the demands of 
strict scrutiny.  Educational quality, remember, is what diversity is 
supposed to enhance.  In Justice Lewis Powell’s phrasing in Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, it is designed to promote “[t]he 
atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’ . . . so essential 
to the quality of higher education[.]”4 
If we think about this proposition in slightly more general terms, 
however, it should seem absurd.  Strict scrutiny is the test that pro-
tects our most fundamental rights.  It is what stops the government 
from sterilizing people,5 from engaging in content-based speech re-
strictions,6 from forbidding them to marry7 or vote.8  But would any 
court allow a state to deny students the vote, or sterilize them, or for-
bid them from marrying, on the grounds that this would enhance 
their education?  Of course not. 
Perhaps you are thinking that such restrictions would not, in fact, 
enhance education, or that they would not be necessary to do so.  But 
the same objection can be made to affirmative action programs, and 
the Court has allowed them to stand.  Before Fisher, Grutter would 
have suggested that deference to educational institutions might be 
appropriate on the questions of efficacy and necessity.9  And even if 
Fisher changes that, we still, apparently, have the rule that racial diver-
sity is a valid consideration for graduate programs in, for instance, 
mathematics and physics, where one would doubt that the different 
experiences of students contribute much to the quality of classroom 
discussion.  One can make as plausible an argument, I think, that 
students who are not distracted by marriage, or voting, or the possi-
bility of children, will get a better education.  (Not to say that this is a 
plausible argument, only that it is as plausible as the argument that 
racial diversity benefits math Ph. Ds.)  So, somehow, we have ended 
up with the idea that educational quality can, in appropriate circum-
stances, outweigh our most fundamental rights. 
How have we come to this?  The idea that educational quality is a 
compelling interest has not gone without criticism.  In Grutter, for in-
stance, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Michigan had no com-
pelling interest in operating an elite law school.10  If that is true, then 
 
 4 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.). 
 5 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 6 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 7 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 8 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 9 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judg-
ment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
 10 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356–57 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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surely there is no compelling interest in increasing the quality of the 
education at whatever law school it does operate, since one of the 
main differentiating characteristics of an elite school should be the 
quality of education.11  But the idea that educational quality is central 
to the Equal Protection Clause has a distinguished pedigree:  it origi-
nates, in fact, in Brown v. Board of Education.  There, the Court rested 
its conclusion that segregated schooling was unconstitutional not on 
the theory that it was an attempt to perpetuate a racial caste system, 
but on the purported fact that it was inherently unequal.  No matter 
whether the system was created in good faith or bad, the Court noted, 
“[t]o separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”12 
The Court constructed its analysis in this way, presumably, be-
cause of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s desire to write an opinion that 
was “above all, non-accusatory.”13  But not even the Brown Court be-
lieved its stated rationale, for Brown’s demand for integration was 
swiftly extended to public pools and golf courses,14 without any show-
ing that racial segregation of such places increased golf handicaps or 
lap times.  Still, the idea existed—and existed in Brown, which be-
came central to our understanding of equal protection.  So it was 
perhaps natural that Justice Powell reached for it when issues of race 
and education came to the Court in Bakke.  Justice Powell, I will sug-
gest, had a motive similar to Justice Warren’s, though in his hands the 
point about educational quality took a surprising new form.  It gener-
ated the argument that constitutes our next proposition. 
 
 11 This is not to say that the teaching at elite schools is better than at non-elite schools.  I 
have seen very little reason to think it is.  But the quality of class discussion—which is the 
main area in which diversity is supposed to bring benefits—is probably enhanced by the 
presence of highly intelligent students.  Elite schools select students on the basis of 
credentials other than simple intelligence, but one would hope that those too would have 
something to do with the quality of class participation. 
 12 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 13 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 699 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (striking down the segrega-
tion of a public park and fishing lake); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (barring 
Atlanta’s practice of permitting different races to use a municipal golf course only on dif-
ferent days); Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 200 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 
1955), aff’d per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (barring Maryland’s segregation of its public 
beaches and bathhouses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 
122 (5th Cir. ), aff’d per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (striking down the denial of the use of a 
city park to blacks).    
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II.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EXISTS TO BENEFIT WHITES 
Who benefits from affirmative action programs?  In the popular 
understanding, the answer is almost certainly that racial minorities 
do—applicants receive preferential treatment in the admissions pro-
cess and are accepted by schools that would have rejected them oth-
erwise.15  Much of the popular opposition to affirmative action stems 
from the prima facie unfairness that its recipients are getting benefits 
they do not deserve. 
But in fact, if we think about the diversity rationale as the Su-
preme Court has recognized it, the benefit to minorities is only inci-
dental.  The point of affirmative action under the diversity rationale, 
after all, is not to enhance the career prospects of its recipients, but 
rather to improve the educational experience of all students who are, 
in the schools where such programs are typically employed, mostly 
white. 
Rather than oppose affirmative action as a burden inflicted on 
them, white applicants should instead see it as a benefit.  True, such a 
program does create a small chance that a particular white applicant 
will be rejected in favor of a minority who has received an admissions 
preference.  But that only happens to a small number of truly liminal 
applicants.16  Any white applicant has a much larger chance of being 
admitted to the same schools she would have in the absence of af-
firmative action, and at each of those schools, the education offered 
will be of higher quality because of the diversity. 
If whites did think about affirmative action in those terms, they 
probably would not oppose it as strenuously as they do.17  The fact of 
white opposition suggests that most people did not buy Justice Pow-
 
 15 I postpone for the moment the argument that preferential admissions treatment is bad 
for minorities. 
 16 See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:  Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1072–78 (2002) (explaining that, mathematically, affirmative 
action does not have a significant effect on any individual white applicant’s probability of 
admission). 
 17 Data on public feelings about affirmative action is actually hard to pin down and seems to 
depend quite strongly on how questions are phrased.  See Allison Kopicki, Answers on 
Affirmative Action Depend on How You Pose the Question, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/answers-on-affirmative-action-depend-on-
how-you-pose-the-question.html.  There does, however, seem to be a strong racial 
divergence—and not the one you would expect if you thought that the main benefits 
accrued to white students.  See Bruce Drake, Public Strongly Backs Affirmative Action Programs 
on Campus, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014) http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/04/22/public-strongly-backs-affirmative-action-programs-on-campus/ 
(finding that more African Americans favor affirmative action programs than whites). 
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ell’s characterization of the interests at stake.  But why did he even at-
tempt to make the sale? 
The answer is not that there were no other state interests to 
choose from.  In cases that preceded Bakke, and in Bakke itself, pro-
ponents of affirmative action offered other goals that such programs 
might serve:  it could create role models for minorities, or make al-
lowance for the effects of societal discrimination.18 
Some of these interests, it could be said, fall outside the missions 
of our institutions of higher education, which are in the business of 
educating students rather than improving society.  But perhaps that 
simply means that the missions have been defined too narrowly.  Im-
proving society is certainly part of the mission of government, and if 
its schools are the instrumentalities best positioned to do so, it is hard 
to see why they should not be used for that purpose—especially if 
there is an incidental boost to educational quality. 
So it seems unlikely that Powell focused on educational quality 
because it was the most important interest, or even the most appro-
priate.  Instead, he most likely chose to designate it, and it alone, as 
compelling for the same reason that Warren invoked it:  he was trying 
to write an opinion that would bring people together.  Casting af-
firmative action as a benefit to white people might have seemed like a 
clever way to do that. 
Of course, it didn’t work.  To quote Justice Antonin Scalia, “the 
American people are not fools.”19  If Justice Powell was trying to imi-
tate Justice Warren, he might have considered the response to 
Brown’s olive branch:  the Southern Manifesto that decried Brown as 
an abuse of power; the stand in the schoolhouse door; the promise of 
“segregation now; segregation forever”; the massive resistance that 
required federal troops to enforce the Court’s decrees.20 
Just like Justice Warren’s, Justice Powell’s gambit failed to create 
consensus.  Indeed, it has left us somewhat worse off than we were be-
fore, because it has foisted upon the defenders of affirmative action a 
justification that is transparently dishonest.21  Ideologues can of 
 
 18 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (discussing the creation of 
role models for minorities); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) 
(discussing allowance for the effects of societal discrimination). 
 19 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 20 See generally Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations:  The Backlash Thesis, 81 
J. AM. HIST. 81, 97–98 (1994) (describing massive resistance to desegregation). 
 21 One could make similar criticisms of Brown itself.  Historians tend to agree that the true 
rationale for Brown was a belief that racial segregation of public schools was an invidious 
attempt to perpetuate a racial caste system.  Warren’s failure to state this rationale made 
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course accommodate all sorts of absurdities and contradictions, and 
ideologues of the left may have internalized the diversity rationale to 
such an extent that they subjectively experience it as making sense.  
But that is something the Supreme Court has forced upon them; it is 
like Winston, under O’Brien’s torture, seeing for one glorious mo-
ment that two and two really do make five.22 
And just as O’Brien did not believe the proposition he hammered 
into Winston’s mind, the Supreme Court does not really believe what 
it has said about the diversity rationale.  For one thing, it is hard for 
Justices to put aside the obvious fact that such programs are designed 
to benefit minorities.23  For another, more honest justifications some-
times creep through the wall of denial.  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, in Grutter, came perhaps the closest to a statement of what 
I believe is the main justification:  a desire to avoid a society stratified 
along racial lines.24 
In fact, the meaning of diversity has shifted a bit over the years, so 
that it now means two almost diametrically opposed things.  In Justice 
Powell’s original formulation, the point of diversity was what the word 
suggests:  difference.  Diverse students brought diverse viewpoints, 
not simply because of their race but because of qualities that (some-
times) went along with it.  In Justice Powell’s words, “The diversity 
that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader 
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element.”25 
But this understanding of diversity, in addition to being dishonest, 
brought some difficulties.  For one thing, it seemed to require uni-
versity administrators to undertake the unpalatable task of deciding 
which minorities were “real” representatives of their race, bringing 
the desired diversity, and which were not.  For another, it seemed to 
 
it possible for later Justices to claim that Brown stood instead for an anticlassificationist or 
colorblind understanding of equal protection. 
 22 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 258 (1950) (“O’Brien held up the fingers of his left hand, 
with the thumb concealed.  ‘There are five fingers there.  Do you see five fingers?’  ‘Yes.’  
And he did see them, for a fleeting instant, before the scenery of his mind changed.  He 
saw five fingers, and there was no deformity.”). 
 23 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,  for instance, Justices on both sides of 
the decision conceptualized affirmative action as a program that particularly benefits 
minorities.  Justice Scalia protested in vain that such an understanding had been placed 
off-limits by Bakke and its sequelae.  134 S.Ct. 1623, 1638, 1644, 1676–78 (2014). 
 24 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (stating that “[i]n order to cultivate a 
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity”). 
 25 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978). 
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use race as a proxy for the diversity.  But if there is one thing strict 
scrutiny should mean, it is that race cannot be used as a proxy unless 
the desired quality is absolutely impossible to ascertain directly.  For 
viewpoint diversity, however, the direct alternative seems simple:  just 
invite students to write an essay describing their unique viewpoints 
and how they were formed. 
So the defenders of affirmative action shied away from the Powell 
understanding of diversity as difference.26  While they endorsed the 
value of different viewpoints, they also ascribed another value to ra-
cial diversity:  diversity as sameness.  The value of racial diversity, on 
this understanding, is not that it necessarily brings different view-
points, but that precisely when it does not, it teaches that race may 
not matter as much as some people think:  it breaks down stereotypes 
and fosters cross-racial understanding.27 
It is good for diversity that it means so much, because if it is to 
work as a justification, diversity has to be irreplaceable.  That is, there 
must be no other way to improve educational quality. 
III.  NOTHING BUT RACIAL DIVERSITY IMPROVES EDUCATIONAL QUALITY 
Here is sad news for those who hope for improvement in our 
schools:  there is nothing to be done that can improve educational 
quality, other than enhancing racial diversity.  This proposition might 
be hard to accept, but for racial preferences to be permissible, it must 
be true.  Strict scrutiny requires that the chosen measure be necessary 
to achieve the government’s interest:  if there is any alternative, it 
must be used. 
 
 26 Wisely so.  In addition to the obvious problem that diverse viewpoints can be measured 
directly, rather than via the proxy of racial classification, the process of deciding whether 
people are “real” representatives of their race would likely not have sat well with Justice 
Kennedy. 
 27 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.  There is a tension, though not necessarily a contradiction, 
between the idea of diversity as difference and that of diversity as sameness.  It might be 
that racial diversity can serve both goals, sometimes bringing distinctive viewpoints and 
sometimes revealing cross-racial similarities.  Diversity as sameness does mean, however, 
that admissions programs should consider race on its own, rather than as a proxy for 
contribution to the robust exchange of ideas.  This point was recognized in the Parents 
Involved litigation; the schools there tried (without success) to defend their programs in 
terms of diversity as sameness rather than diversity as difference.  See Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725–26 (2007) (“Each school district 
argues that educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse 
learning environment, and each contends that because the diversity they seek is racial 
diversity—not the broader diversity at issue in Grutter—it makes sense to promote that 
interest directly by relying on race alone.”). 
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Of course, this proposition is almost self-evidently absurd.28  There 
are plenty of other ways to improve education.  We could give every 
student a laptop.  Or we could ban laptops entirely—some evidence 
suggests that this would improve classroom discussions, perhaps more 
than racial diversity does.29  We could pay faculty more.  The possibili-
ties are almost limitless.30 
Here again, the affirmative action cases share a weakness with 
Brown.  The Brown opinion rested on the proposition that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”31  But this seems un-
likely.  Assume that the stigma of segregation interferes to some 
quantifiable extent with the learning of black students.  Equality, in 
terms of educational quality, should be achievable by simply making 
the black schools better than the white schools in some ways (better 
teachers, bigger libraries, etc.) until the stigma is offset. 
It is hard to imagine the segregationists of the 1950s doing such a 
thing, of course, but if they had, does anyone believe that the consti-
tutional defect would have been cured?  It seems unlikely—which is 
to say that a difference in educational quality was probably not the 
real problem. 
In both Brown and the affirmative action cases, then, the focus on 
educational quality has given us an analytical structure that fits poorly 
with the actual constitutional principles at stake.  For Brown, the ex-
istence of alternate paths to equality suggests that integration was not 
actually constitutionally required.  For affirmative action, the exist-
ence of alternative means of improving education means that affirm-
ative action programs should be held unconstitutional under real 
strict scrutiny.  Fisher does not quite take us there, since it still seems 
to accept racial diversity in itself as a compelling interest and to ask 
only whether explicit racial preferences are necessary to achieve di-
versity.  But this is mistaken; racial diversity is not an end in itself, ac-
 
 28 Justice Clarence Thomas does a good job of displaying its absurdity in his opinion in 
Grutter.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 29 Valerie Strauss, Why a Leading Professor of New Media Just Banned Technology Use in Class, 
WASH. POST ANSWER SHEET (Sept. 25, 2014), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/25/why-a-leading-professor-of-new-media-just-banned-
technology-use-in-class/.  
 30 I have listed ways of improving educational quality that might be expected to substitute 
for the effects of diversity as difference.  Diversity as sameness does something slightly 
different; rather than enhancing educational quality in general, it improves cross-racial 
understanding.  But presumably this effect could be achieved by other means as well, 
most likely by supplementing the curriculum. 
 31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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cording to the Supreme Court.32  It is only a compelling interest be-
cause of the benefits it brings, and if those benefits can be realized by 
alternate methods, those methods must be used. 
In fact, and we come now to the next proposition, integration for 
its own sake is not merely a less than compelling interest.  According 
to the Supreme Court, it is a forbidden state purpose. 
IV.  RACIAL INTEGRATION IS A FORBIDDEN STATE PURPOSE 
What was Brown v. Board of Education about?  I will consider that 
question in somewhat more detail later, when I examine the affirma-
tive account the Court has provided.  Now, I want only to examine 
the negative side, to point out what it was not about.  According to 
the Court, Brown was not about integration.  We know this because 
Brown was (everyone agrees) a great decision pursuing an important 
value.  But whatever that value was, it was not integration (by which I 
mean simply the presence of members of different races in some par-
ticular setting) because integration is not, the Court says, a good 
thing as far as the Constitution is concerned.  It is not a compelling 
interest; indeed, it is not even legitimate.33  Attempting to ensure rep-
resentation of different racial groups for its own sake has actually 
been repeatedly “condemned as illegitimate.”34 
This is not to say that the government is forbidden from operating 
an integrated school system.  Such a system could arise through hap-
penstance, and there would be no constitutional objections.  More 
importantly, the government is free to promote integration and de-
fend it on the grounds that it produces particular benefits, though 
Parents Involved shows that it would be put to demanding proofs.  The 
 
 32 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–30 (2007) 
(“We have many times over reaffirmed that ‘[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its 
own sake.’  [Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)].  See also Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); [Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.] Bakke, [438 U.S. 265, 
307 (1978)] (opinion of Powell, J.) (‘If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student 
body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic 
origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected . . . as facially invalid[.]’).  Grutter it-
self reiterated that ‘outright racial balancing’ is ‘patently unconstitutional.’  [Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)].”).  
 33 See supra note 32.  
 34 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S at 726.  This idea, too, goes back to Bakke, where Justice 
Powell wrote, “If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified 
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a 
preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.  
Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is 
discrimination for its own sake.  This the Constitution forbids.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
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government would be forced to show, for instance, that the benefits it 
claimed were produced by particular levels of integration, and that its 
program produced those levels and no more.35 
What does seem to be the case, though, is that racial integration 
for its own sake—a  mere belief, unsupported by evidence, that racial 
isolation or de facto segregation is undesirable—is illegitimate.  The 
government cannot simply aver that it believes integration is better 
than segregation.  Perhaps more surprisingly, this phenomenon is 
true somewhat more broadly:  the government cannot simply aver 
that it prefers equality to inequality.  If a particular sorting device—a 
test for promotion by state employers, perhaps, or one used for ad-
mission to state schools—has a disparate impact on some race, it 
seems that the government is not allowed to discard it for that reason, 
or at least that it would face a serious constitutional challenge in try-
ing to do so.  That is so because of our next proposition:  from a con-
stitutional perspective, avoiding disparate impact is worse than ac-
cepting it. 
V.  AVOIDING DISPARATE IMPACT IS WORSE THAN ACCEPTING IT 
We all know the doctrinal rules about disparate impact.  Mere dis-
parate impact by itself is of no constitutional significance.  The ap-
propriate level of scrutiny is rational basis review.  Unless the plaintiff 
can show that the disparate impact was generated intentionally—that 
some sorting device was used in order to produce a particular racial 
outcome, the Court will not consider it intentional discrimination.36  
Thus, if a state actor persists in using some device that has been 
demonstrated to produce a disparate impact, rational basis review 
remains appropriate unless a plaintiff can show that the use was “be-
cause of” rather than “in spite of” or “without regard for” the out-
come.  Strict scrutiny comes only if the plaintiff can show that the 
state actor sought to produce a particular racial outcome. 
So a state actor who is indifferent to disparate impact is free to 
persist in the course of action that produces it.  But what if the state 
actor is not indifferent?  What if the state actor thinks disparate im-
pact is undesirable?  That attitude, perhaps, is similar to a state view 
that integration is better than isolation.  And the Court treats it the 
same way:  as illegitimate.37 
 
 35 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725–31 (utilizing this test). 
 36 This is subject to the caveat that this rule appears to have been undermined in the 
context of affirmative action programs in higher education, as discussed in note 43 infra. 
 37 See supra note 32.  
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If a state actor discards a sorting device that produces disparate 
impact, what has it done?  It has selected a new one (let us suppose, a 
race-neutral one) in order to achieve a particular racial outcome.  
And our disparate impact doctrine, described above, tells us that this 
is intentional discrimination.  An attempt to avoid disparate impact, 
then, will get strict scrutiny. 
We do not yet have a Supreme Court decision articulating this 
proposition in the context of affirmative action, but it seems a rela-
tively straightforward application of disparate impact doctrine.  Since 
a preference for racial balance is illegitimate, avoiding disparate im-
pact is nothing more than seeking to achieve a particular racial out-
come.  And that, we know, triggers strict scrutiny. 
We do, moreover, have a decision articulating a similar proposi-
tion in the context of government employment:  Ricci v. DeStefano.38  
In that case, the city of New Haven discarded a test it had used to 
identify firefighters eligible for promotion on the grounds that it had 
a disparate impact on blacks.39  Doing so, the Court ruled, was dispar-
ate treatment—intentional discrimination—with respect to the white 
firefighters.40 
In Ricci, of course, the test had already been administered, and 
throwing out the scores meant denying the white firefighters some-
thing they had earned under the announced system.41  That unfair-
ness no doubt made the plaintiffs sympathetic on the facts.  But the 
logic of the decision does not depend on whether the test had been 
taken (it was about discrimination, not vested rights).  Surely, if we 
were dealing with an attempt to produce a disparate impact, we 
would not consider it anodyne if done on a prospective basis.42  And 
since no particular racial outcome is constitutionally preferable—
since there is no outcome that state actors are permitted to seek for 
its own sake—an attempt to avoid disparate impact is conceptually 
and constitutionally identical to an attempt to produce it. 
 
 38 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 39 Id. at 563. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 593. 
 42 Imagine, for instance, that a college admissions board decides that a particular race-
neutral test is letting in too many blacks and switches to a different, also race-neutral, test 
that will let in fewer.  Surely that counts as intentional discrimination, as Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot tells us.  364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) (“[I]t is difficult to appreciate what stands in 
the way of adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles 
by which this Court must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes that, howsoever 
speciously defined, obviously discriminate against colored citizens.”).  
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This leads to the puzzling conclusion that one thing the Equal 
Protection Clause does is to lock in disparate impacts that state offi-
cials would like to eliminate.  If the officials are indifferent, of course, 
there is no problem:  they are free to change the rules that produce 
disparate impacts.  But officials (those concerned, presumably, with 
racial equality) who care about disparate impact are the ones who are 
foreclosed from acting.43 
Generally speaking, the majority culture arranges things around 
its own norms and expectations, and so generally speaking, we are 
more likely to see disparate impacts that burden minorities.  The 
consequence, then, is that the Equal Protection Clause will tend to 
lock in legal regimes or administrative systems that disproportionately 
disadvantage minorities.  That might seem strange.  A facially race-
neutral action that intentionally benefits historically disadvantaged 
minorities might seem less constitutionally problematic, from an 
equality perspective, than a facially race-neutral action that uninten-
tionally injures them.  After all, when we say that the injury is unin-
tentional, all we mean is that the plaintiff cannot prove intent.  If we 
thought that intent was frequently hard to prove, we might think that 
a bad intent is more likely to lurk behind the “unintentional” burden 
on minorities than behind the intentional preference for them.44 
But it turns out—according to the Court—that this instinctive re-
action is wrong.  Racial preferences for minorities (and here I in-
clude both explicit racial classifications and facially neutral classifica-
 
 43 There’s another puzzle here, in that the Supreme Court has long noted that 
discrimination can exist without classification.  If a government actor employs a race-
neutral screening device in order to produce a particular racial outcome, that has 
historically been considered race discrimination.  Obviously, if it were not, there would be 
no protection against discrimination via various proxies that correlate with race.  But in 
the context of affirmative action, various Justices have suggested that this rule does not 
hold.  The United States offered “race-neutral” methods for achieving racial diversity in 
Gratz and Grutter by pointing to the Texas Ten Percent Plan.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244, 303 n.10 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003).  Similarly, in Parents 
Involved, Justice Kennedy wrote of drawing attendance zones with an awareness of 
neighborhood demographics.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. V. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Yet in the ordinary course of things, neither of these measures would be 
considered race-neutral.  Indeed, the Court’s redistricting cases show a vivid sensitivity to 
the possibility of race discrimination through boundary drawing.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 
517 U.S. 899, 901 (1996) (rehearing Shaw v. Reno); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 629, 633 
(1993) (highlighting that the case involves the “sensitive issue[]” of “race-based state 
legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority 
groups”). 
 44 For a broader perspective on this issue, see generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 
(1997). 
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tions with intentional disparate impact, since they both receive strict 
scrutiny) are more likely to be a disguised attempt to harm minorities 
than is a race-neutral program that injures them. 
VI.  RACIAL PREFERENCES THAT FAVOR MINORITIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO 
BE AN ATTEMPT TO HARM THEM THAN IS A RACE-NEUTRAL PROGRAM 
THAT INJURES THEM 
Who believes this?  If you answered no one, you are not far off:  
there is probably no one on the current Supreme Court who does.  
But for a while, one Justice did, or claimed to:  Justice O’Connor.  
And because Justice O’Connor was for a while the median Justice on 
affirmative action issues, her view was for a while controlling. 
That view was that racial classifications are not all the same.  (This 
distinguishes her from the current majority, which has a more strong-
ly anticlassificationist view.45)  Some are benign, and some are invidi-
ous.  The point of strict scrutiny, Justice O’Connor repeated again 
and again, is to distinguish the benign from the invidious.46 
Of course, this makes no sense at all.  If an invidious classification 
is one that is intended to oppress or stigmatize, or one motivated by 
racial hostility or notions of inferiority,47 while a benign one is one 
that is intended to promote equality and cross-racial understanding, 
 
 45 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 741–43 
(2007) (rejecting “the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis”).  Justice 
Kennedy, who is the new median Justice after Justice O’Connor’s replacement by Justice 
Alito, occasionally suggests that motives might matter, but the current majority view is 
better captured by the proposition that all racial classifications carry heavy costs and strict 
scrutiny is a method of ensuring that those costs are offset by sufficient benefits.  In Jed 
Rubenfeld’s words, the justification for strict scrutiny has shifted from smoking-out to 
balancing.  See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L. J. 427, 465 (1997) 
(“[C]urrent affirmative action shifts from the smoking-out to the cost-benefit view of strict 
scrutiny . . . .”). 
 46 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“We have insisted on strict 
scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial classifications . . . .”); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“‘Absent searching judicial inquiry into the 
justification for such race-based measures,’ we have no way to determine what 
‘classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.’” (internal citations 
omitted)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting Croson's 
explanation of why strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is essential); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (“But the mere  recitation 
of a ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no 
weight.”). 
 47 This is more or less how the Court used the word in its early cases interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law 
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1676–77 (2005) (discussing “the story of 
equal protection jurisprudence”). 
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there is no doubt as to how to classify affirmative action programs.  
More significantly, the complicated dance of strict scrutiny does not 
help with that classification—not least because the Court has said that 
the only compelling interest in the educational context is diversity, 
and diversity is not, in this taxonomy, benign.  (As the Court has de-
fined it, remember, diversity primarily benefits white students and is 
intended to do that.)  In fact, if we accept Justice O’Connor’s view, 
we reach the following surprising conclusion:  the University of Mich-
igan sought to oppress minorities at the undergraduate level but up-
lift them at the law school. 
 
VII.  THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN WAS INVIDIOUS IN ITS 
UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS BUT BENIGN AT THE LAW SCHOOL LEVEL 
Here again we have a proposition that only Justice O’Connor be-
lieved.  In the Gratz and Grutter cases, eight Justices found the Michi-
gan law school and undergraduate programs indistinguishable and 
voted either to uphold both or strike them both down.  Justice 
O’Connor, however, managed to find a distinction and split the dif-
ference, voting to uphold the law school program but strike down the 
undergraduate one.48  But because Justice O’Connor was the median 
Justice, her views controlled. 
What was the difference she saw that no one else could?  Doctri-
nally, what separates Gratz from Grutter is that the law school program 
(which used no fixed point system and considered each applicant ho-
listically) was narrowly tailored to serve the diversity interest, while 
the undergraduate one (which used a fixed point-based system) was 
not.49  This in itself is a somewhat odd feature on which to pin deci-
sive significance:  in both cases, some individuals who would have 
been accepted under a race-blind admissions process were rejected 
because of their race.  If that is the injury from which the Equal Pro-
tection Clause protects, it is hard to see why it should matter that the 
law school inflicted the injury in a less obvious way.50  (In fact, the im-
 
 48 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (differentiating between the two 
cases); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44 (2003) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was 
not violated by the law school). 
 49 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273–74 (illustrating the flaws in the university’s system); Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 334–35 (holding that the law school’s program survives strict scrutiny). 
 50 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The ‘percentage plans’ are just as race 
conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results 
without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing it.  In contrast, 
Michigan states its purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I would be 
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plication that seems to follow from the Gratz/Grutter narrow tailoring 
analysis is that the Equal Protection injury is something else—most 
likely the stigma imposed on beneficiaries and/or the stoking of re-
sentment and racial tension, since that is what concealment of the 
role of race reduces.) 
But taking a step back reveals another oddity.  Remember that the 
point of strict scrutiny, according to Justice O’Connor, is to distin-
guish benign from invidious classifications.51  In her mind, then, the 
difference between the University of Michigan graduate and under-
graduate admissions procedures would seem to be that the former is 
benign and the latter invidious.52 
We have seen thus far that in the Court’s jurisprudence, the Equal 
Protection Clause is doing some things that one might not have ex-
pected—prohibiting a preference for integration, for instance, and 
locking in practices that disadvantage minorities.  Since the Equal 
Protection Clause was designed first and foremost to protect the 
freed slaves, these are surprising roles for it to play.  But a moment’s 
consideration of the clause as it appears in the Court’s affirmative ac-
tion jurisprudence will show us more surprising things yet.  For one, 
the Equal Protection Clause is designed to keep blacks in their place. 
VIII. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IS DESIGNED TO KEEP BLACKS 
IN THEIR PLACE 
This is perhaps an inflammatory way of phrasing the point.  One 
could also say that it is designed to prevent black students from 
reaching above their abilities and injuring themselves by stretching 
too far.  Affirmative action in fact harms its purported beneficiaries, 
goes the argument.  As Justice Thomas put it in Grutter, “[t]he Law 
School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a Universi-
ty of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers.  The-
se overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot 
 
tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its frankness.  Equal protection 
cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification 
for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications 
are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate 
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”). 
 52 This is an absurd conclusion, of course, the absurdity showing us that strict scrutiny does 
not in fact distinguish benign from invidious discrimination.  Instead, it now seems to 
play the role of balancing out the injury inflicted by racial classifications—although, as 
noted in the text, the form that the narrow tailoring analysis takes suggests that the injury 
is not what one might have expected. 
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succeed in the cauldron of competition.”53  Soon after Grutter, the 
mismatch argument appeared in the academic literature:  black stu-
dents, and other beneficiaries of racial preferences, are placed into 
schools where they cannot compete and end up with worse outcomes 
than they would have had they attended less selective schools.54 
The merits of mismatch as a policy argument are open to debate.  
The factual premises have been criticized,55 and even if they are ac-
cepted, it may be that there are other benefits (such as networking) 
that accrue to students at elite schools.  (And as far as the policy ar-
gument goes, one wonders why it is presented with respect to racial 
preferences but not, for example, preferences for alumni children or 
recruited athletes.)  As a constitutional argument, however, and in 
particular as an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is 
quite astonishing.  The Reconstruction Congress was concerned 
about various things, and there are various plausible ways of charac-
terizing the principles they enacted with the Equal Protection Clause.  
But one must strain pretty hard to find on that list the idea of keep-
ing blacks out of schools that are too good for them. 
Still, this principle is at least nominally linked to the welfare of 
minority students.  The Court’s next understanding of the role of 
equal protection lacks even that shred of justification. 
IX. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IS DESIGNED TO AVOID 
WHITE RESENTMENT 
It takes a bit of digging to get to this principle, but only a bit.  One 
of the problems with racial classifications, the Court frequently ob-
serves, is that it may “pit[] the races against one another [and] exac-
erbate[] racial tension . . . .”56  Preferences may “provoke resentment 
among those who believe that they have been wronged by the gov-
ernment’s use of race.”57 
 
 53 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 54 See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 367, 479 (2004) (claiming that affirmative action produces low minority bar 
passage rates). 
 55 See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Comment, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students To 
Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997, 1998 (2005) (criticizing Sander’s methodology). 
 56 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 759 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 57 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995); see also Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. at 746 (describing consequences of racial classifications, including “a politics of 
racial hostility” and “an escalation of racial hostility and conflict” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Racial tension is a bad thing, certainly, and it does not seem en-
tirely unreasonable to suppose that the Equal Protection Clause is de-
signed to reduce it . . . until we start to think about exactly what this 
racial tension and resentment amount to.  In the context of affirma-
tive action, this resentment is the resentment of white applicants who 
think that the minority beneficiaries are getting something they do 
not deserve, something that properly belongs to the whites.  Racial 
tension and resentment, in short, mean whites getting upset that 
blacks and other minorities are being treated too well, and particular-
ly that they are being treated well at the expense of whites. 
Again, there might be a policy argument that this is a factor 
decisionmakers should take into account—though I think the case is 
considerably weaker than for the mismatch argument.  But as an in-
terpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it beggars description.  
The Reconstruction Congress dissolved Southern legislatures and put 
the South under military control in order to obtain the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.58  It did not do that to ensure that 
someday in the future whites would not be upset because they 
thought blacks were taking what was rightfully theirs.59 
It is very strange to think of the Equal Protection Clause as de-
signed to prevent blacks from aspiring above their abilities and to 
protect whites from the offense of seeing their entitlements given 
away to minorities.  If you did think that, though, you might actually 
accept the next of the Court’s propositions, which is that the Clause is 
based on animus against minorities. 
 
 58 See generally Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013) (“The Southern states had been placed under 
military rule, and were forced to ratify the [Fourteenth] Amendment—which they 
despised with an (un)holy hatred—as a condition of ending military occupation and 
rejoining the Union.”). 
 59 Though flat-out absurd as a valid concern under the Equal Protection Clause, the issue of 
white resentment does raise an interesting question:  why, among the various preferences 
used by institutions of higher education (legacy status, geography, athletic ability, wealth, 
etc.), does race alone trigger such outrage?  There are, I think, two plausible 
explanations.  One is that whites experience more resentment at the thought that a racial 
minorities have taken their places than at the thought that alumni children have. (Which 
is to say, simple racism is a possible explanation.)  Another, which I prefer, is that whites 
feel accused by affirmative action in ways that they do not by other preferences.  A legacy 
preference contains no suggestion that the nonpreferred applicants are being forced to 
atone for their sins, while a racial preference may.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 
at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
“there can be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor race.”).  But of course this is 
not a necessary implication; we ask people to accept burdens to help out the victims of 
natural disasters without in any way blaming them for hurricanes and droughts. 
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X. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IS BASED ON ANIMUS AGAINST 
MINORITIES 
It takes a bit of digging to uncover this proposition, too, and it 
turns out to be held (even implicitly) by only one Justice.  But since 
that Justice is Anthony Kennedy, the proposition is very important. 
Start with the consequences of the use of strict scrutiny for race-
based affirmative action.  What does the college admissions process 
look like if explicit racial preferences are forbidden, as seems likely to 
happen in the near future?  The answer is not that we return to a per-
fectly fair world of pure meritocracy, on whose escutcheon racial 
preferences were a solitary and singular blot.  As mentioned earlier, 
the admissions process is riddled with preferences, some with con-
nections to an expansive concept of merit (e.g., athletic ability), and 
some with no connection at all (e.g., legacy status and parental 
wealth).  All of these preferences survive; racial preferences alone are 
struck down.  Rather than being the only departure from merit used 
by schools (as opponents sometimes portray them), racial prefer-
ences end up being the only departure from merit that cannot be 
used by schools. 
Generalize one step further to the broader receipt of government 
benefits.  Most groups that want to receive benefits from the govern-
ment can do so by persuading politicians at any level of government 
that have the power to award them—admissions officers, university 
regents, city councils, state legislators, or what have you.  Whether 
these groups get benefits depends simply on their ability to work the 
political process. 
But the situation is different for racial minorities.  An award of 
benefits to them will be subjected to strict scrutiny, and if recent cases 
mean what they seem to, it will almost always fail.  There are only two 
interests that have been recognized as compelling in the affirmative 
action context.  The first—remedying the state’s own discrimination, 
which could support properly tailored government contracting set-
asides—has become increasingly unavailable as that discrimination 
recedes into the past.  The second—diversity in higher education—is 
likewise on the way out, if Fisher means what it seems to.  The result, 
in short order, will be that the award of benefits to racial minorities is 
categorically impermissible.  Almost any other group can receive 
benefits from any level of government, but for racial minorities to ob-
tain similar relief, they will have to amend the federal Constitution. 
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The imposition of this disability on racial minorities is quite simi-
lar to the restructuring of the political process that the Hunter/Seattle 
doctrine60 condemns, and similar also to the Colorado constitutional 
amendment that Justice Kennedy described as “inexplicable by any-
thing but animus.”61  The Hunter/Seattle doctrine has perhaps been 
modified by Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,62 but Romer 
v. Evans is certainly still good law.  It is only a bit of a stretch, then, to 
say that for the Court’s current understanding of equal protection to 
make sense, we must conclude that the Clause embodies animus 
against racial minorities. 
We can also put the point slightly differently, relying on a case 
that has informed the Court’s understanding of when heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause. 
XI. CAROLENE PRODUCTS’ FOOTNOTE FOUR IDENTIFIES GROUPS 
THAT SHOULD BE FROZEN OUT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
In a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the 
Supreme Court noted that prejudice against certain “discrete and in-
sular” minorities might “be a special condition, which tends seriously 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”63  Such minorities, the 
Court believed, might find the political process insensitive to their in-
terests because other groups would not form coalitions with them.  In 
the ordinary play of politics, interest groups will form coalitions 
whose composition shifts over time.  Today’s loser will be tomorrow’s 
 
 60 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (holding that “the [s]tate may no more 
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its 
behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation 
than another of comparable size”); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 
486–87 (1982) (applying the Hunter Doctrine and finding that a community could not 
require that laws created to improve race relations or protect minorities be confirmed by 
a popular vote of the electorate when comparable laws are “exempted from a similar 
procedure”). 
 61 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  In Romer, Colorado enacted an amendment 
that prevented the state and also local subdivisions such as cities and municipalities from 
enacting laws that favored LGBT people by, for instance, prohibiting discrimination 
against them. 
 62 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633–34 (2014) (Ken-
nedy, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting the lower court’s reading of “broad language” from 
Parents Involved); id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing the Ken-
nedy’s “repudiat[ion]” of those decisions); id. at 1653–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (ac-
cusing the majority of “effectively discard[ing]” those precedents).    
 63 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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winner, and vice versa.  In the long run, the idea goes, each group 
will get a relatively equal opportunity to be part of a majority coali-
tion and receive benefits on that basis.  But if other groups refuse to 
form coalitions with discrete and insular minorities—of whom racial 
minorities are a paradigm case—those minorities may never get the 
chance to be in the majority, and their interests will repeatedly be 
sacrificed.64  Footnote four, in short, identifies groups who may be 
frozen out of interest group politics by prejudice and whose interests 
therefore require extra judicial protection. 
At least, that is what the footnote does if we use it to identify 
groups that are special in terms of heightened scrutiny for laws that 
burden their interests.  If we start using it to identify groups that are 
special because laws that benefit them get heightened scrutiny, we 
have done something very different.  Imposing strict scrutiny on laws 
that benefit racial minorities means, as suggested above, that very few 
such laws, if any, will survive.  And what that means is that interest 
group politics, on the model described above, is closed to racial mi-
norities.  They might, conceivably, form part of a majority coalition, 
but a law that is designed to benefit them—the ordinary spoils of the 
democratic process—will be invalidated under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  If it is invalidated only as to them, it simply takes away any 
reason for that group to participate in interest group politics, since 
they can never reap the benefits.  If it is invalidated in toto, there is a 
somewhat stronger effect:  the group becomes poison to any aspiring 
majority coalition.  No other group will ally with it.  Footnote four, on 
this reading, identifies groups that the Constitution freezes out of in-
terest group politics. 
That might seem like a paradox.  Carolene Products is generally un-
derstood to say something about groups that need protection from 
the political process, not groups that must be excluded from it by 
judges.  But paradox, or even outright contradiction, should not faze 
us.  In fact, it is a hallmark of the Court’s affirmative action jurispru-
dence.  Another example follows. 
XII.  PATERNALISM IS  ANTI-PATERNALISM 
We have already seen that, according to the Court, the benefits of 
affirmative action accrue primarily to white students, and its burdens, 
at least potentially, fall on those minority students who are unable to 
 
 64 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals:  Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 983, 992 (2006) (describing the failure of interest group pluralism to protect 
discrete and insular minorities). 
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resist the temptation to attend good schools.65  These characteriza-
tions might seem strange—certainly, they do not line up very well 
with the demographic realities about who supports affirmative action 
and who opposes it.66  To find the next contradiction in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, though, we do not need to look at demographics.  A 
dictionary suffices. 
How would we characterize the act of “tantaliz[ing]” minority stu-
dents with the prospect of an elite education?67  Justice Thomas 
chooses the phrase “racial paternalism.”68  This is an odd thing to say, 
because paternalism, after all, is the act of limiting people’s choices 
on the grounds that they will make a bad one.  Affirmative action 
does not do that, even on the mismatch theory:  what it does is offer 
minority applicants an option they should be wary of taking. 
The misdescription by itself would not merit comment were it not 
for the fact that one side in this debate is, indeed, engaged in pater-
nalism.  It is Justice Thomas’s side; it is the side of mismatch theorists.  
Their claim, remember, is that attending an elite school will ultimate-
ly prove harmful to minority students . . . and that, therefore, this op-
tion should be taken away from them.  That is paternalism, plain and 
simple.  And since this argument is made with respect to racial minor-
ities alone, and not other beneficiaries of admissions preferences 
such as legacies or athletes, it is fair to call it racial paternalism.69 
 
 65 By focusing on the harm minorities inflict on themselves by making bad decisions, the 
mismatch argument interestingly parallels some of the more recent anti-abortion 
arguments, which also work in terms of protecting women from the consequences of 
their choices.  See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:  A Historical Perspecitve on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).  Abortion 
opponents, who used to frame the issue as a conflict between selfish women and  the 
innocent unborn now add an extra dimension, suggesting  an additional conflict between 
naïve women and unscrupulous abortionists.  Likewise, opponents of affirmative action, 
who used to frame the issue as a conflict between deserving whites and undeserving 
minorities, now add the extra dimension of conflict between naïve minorities and 
unscrupulous administrators.  Questions of scruples aside, it is worth considering the 
benefits that people of color bring to institutions that want an appearance of diversity.  
For an exploration of this issue, see generally Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
 66 See supra note 17. 
 67 See supra text accompanying note 53.  
 68 Adarand Constructors  v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 69 That does not necessarily mean that the argument is incorrect.  The Constitution, after 
all, is paternalistic.  It takes away certain policy choices—slavery, censorship, etc.—that 
today’s majorities may think are desirable.  But it does give an odd flavor to Justice 
Thomas’s plea on behalf of minorities to be “[l]et . . . alone!”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
What the Black Man Wants:  An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 26, 
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Still, paternalism is motivated by a desire to improve the welfare of 
those whose choices are restricted.  So it is relatively clear, according 
to the Supreme Court, that the people who oppose affirmative action 
are the ones who truly care about the welfare of minority students. 
XIII.  THE OPPONENTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ARE THE ONES WHO 
CARE ABOUT MINORITY STUDENTS 
Again, this proposition matches up somewhat uneasily with the 
demographics of opinion about affirmative action at the national lev-
el.  But it appears quite well entrenched at the Supreme Court.  Pro-
ponents of affirmative action, as the Court has framed the issue, are 
seeking to improve the education of white students.70  They do so in a 
way that stigmatizes minorities, makes them the target of resentment, 
and may hurt their career prospects.71  Small wonder that anyone who 
cares about minority welfare would take the other side.  (Indeed, by 
focusing on the plight of beneficiaries of racial preferences, rather 
than legacies or recruited athletes, the opponents of affirmative ac-
tion demonstrate how pure and focused is their concern for minority 
welfare.72) 
Small wonder, too, that the champions of minorities resent any 
questioning of their devotion.  In Schuette, Chief Justice John Roberts 
bristled at the suggestion that his solution to discrimination on the 
basis of race (stopping discrimination based on race73) might be 
something less than a complete cure.  “People can disagree in good 
faith on this issue [of whether racial preferences ‘do more harm than 
 
1865, reprinted in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blassingame & John 
R. McKivigan eds., 1991).  An applicant who does not wish to benefit from affirmative 
action can probably manage to avoid it.  One might equally imagine blacks asking the 
Supreme Court to let them alone, to let them succeed or fail through the ordinary 
political process open to other groups. 
 70 See supra text accompanying notes 15–16. 
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
 72 The reference to legacies is a bit of a joke, since there seems to be no substantial reason 
to think that legacy admits have worse outcomes than non-legacies.  The plight of 
recruited athletes at universities with major athletic programs, however, is serious.  See, 
e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops?  Learning-Disabled 
Student Athletes and the NCAA Initital Academic Eligibiligty Requirements, 66 TENN. L. REV. 
1049, 1051 (1999) (discussing “charges that the college sports industry recruits student-
athletes without regard for their academic preparation for college, exploits them for their 
athletic prowess and marketability, and then tosses them aside once their athletic 
eligibility is exhausted”). 
 73 See Parents Involved in Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) 
(“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis 
of race.”). 
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good’],” he wrote, “but it similarly does more harm than good to 
question the openness and candor of those on either side of the de-
bate.”74  Chief Justice Roberts was perhaps particularly offended be-
cause he believes that in ending affirmative action, he is carrying for-
ward the noble work of the litigants and activists behind Brown v. 
Board of Education. 
That might surprise you.  If affirmative action ends, it seems likely 
that the representation of minority students at elite schools will de-
crease.  (Indeed, the California experience substantiates this fear.75)  
And is de facto resegregation of elite schools really the culmination 
of the dream of Brown?  From the Court’s perspective, the question is 
misleading because, according to the Supreme Court, Brown was ac-
tually not about segregation. 
XIV. BROWN WAS NOT ABOUT SEGREGATION 
In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the great 
achievement of the Supreme Court in Brown was to “require[] school 
districts to ‘achieve a system of determining admission to the public 
schools on a nonracial basis.’”76  It follows from this that the constitu-
tional defect in the pre-Brown systems of racially segregated schools 
was not segregation, per se.  Fundamentally, it was nothing more 
than “according differential treatment to American children on the 
basis of their color or race.”77  And since race-based affirmative action 
 
 74 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring).  There is a striking contrast in tone between this acknowledgement of good 
faith disagreement and the Roberts opinion in Parents Involved.  In Parents Involved, in 
addition to explaining how to stop discrimination on the basis of race, Chief Justice 
Roberts proclaimed it clear which side of the debate was faithful to Brown and accused 
Justice Stephen Breyer of arguing that the ends justified the means, among other things.  
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735–36, 747 (stating that “[t]here is no ambiguity” in the 
plaintiffs’ position in Brown and claiming that Breyer’s dissent “fails to ground the result 
it would reach in law [but instead] selectively relies on inapplicable precedent and even 
dicta while dismissing contrary holdings, alters and misapplies our well-established legal 
framework for assessing equal protection challenges to express racial classifications, and 
greatly exaggerates the consequences of today’s decision”). 
 75 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1679–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)  (citing the decline at the 
University of California of the number of minority students since the abandonment of 
race-conscious admissions policies). 
 76 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 at 746–47 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 
300–01 (1955)). 
 77 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (quoting Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for 
Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument at 15, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
1953 WL 48699 at *15. 
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programs78 do just that, Brown clearly marks them as unconstitutional.  
“[H]istory will be heard.”79 
Not everyone agrees with this characterization of Brown.80  For one 
thing, while Roberts focuses on language about race-neutrality from 
Brown II,81 he ignores the fact that the Court then went on to order 
race-conscious remedies, such as bussing, which “determine admis-
sion to a public school on a racial basis.”82  If determining school ad-
mission on a racial basis is sometimes the cure for a constitutional vi-
olation, it may be that the violation is a little more complicated than 
merely the consideration of race. 
In fact, when Brown I identifies the constitutional violation, it does 
not talk about mere racial classifications.  What violates the Constitu-
tion, according to Brown I, is separation that denotes inferiority.83  (To his 
credit, Roberts acknowledges this point, before dropping it in favor 
of Brown II’s language about race-neutrality.)84 
So Brown may not quite do the work that opponents of affirmative 
action hope.  But there is another important and controversial Su-
preme Court case that might.  The strongest support for the Roberts 
 
 78 It is worth noting that the Parents Involved program was not classic affirmative action 
because it did not involve a preference in a generally merit-based competition for 
benefits. School assignments were not merit-based, and no racial group was systematically 
benefited or burdened.  This means that some of the standard arguments against 
affirmative action—that it stigmatizes its beneficiaries, for instance, or places them in 
environments where they cannot succeed—had no traction.  For further development of 
this point, see infra Part XV. 
 79 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746. 
 80 Roberts asserts that the plaintiffs in Brown argued for colorblindness.  See id. at 747 (“The 
parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but the 
position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been 
clearer:  ‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential 
treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race.’” (quoting Brief for 
Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument, supra note 
78, at 15)).  Two of those lawyers, Jack Greenberg and William T. Coleman, Jr., described 
this claim as, respectively, “preposterous” and “100 percent wrong.”  See David Schraub, 
Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1279 (2013). 
 81 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  
 82 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747. 
 83 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate them from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
 84 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (“In [Brown] we held that segregation deprived black 
children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and 
other tangible factors were equal, because government classification and separation on 
grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority.”). 
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position in Parents Involved is probably Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey.85 
XV.  WHAT SUPPORTS PARENTS INVOLVED IS NOT BROWN BUT CASEY 
This proposition might not be obvious.  But it follows from a con-
sideration of what harms inhered in the Parents Involved program.  
The schools in that case occasionally used race to determine assign-
ment in what was not otherwise a merit-based competitive system.86  
That means that the program did not suffer from the prima facie un-
fairness of giving people things they were not otherwise entitled to.  
Nor did it pose a risk of stigmatizing its beneficiaries, or placing them 
in a “cauldron of competition” in which they could not succeed.  The 
main harm of the program was simply that it involved government 
classification of individuals on the basis of race. 
What kind of a harm is that?  One might say (some Justices do) 
that mere classification is undesirable because it increases the sali-
ence of race.  But that is hardly an argument about injury to a specific 
person, and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court frequently re-
minds us, protects persons, not groups.87  The harm a person suffers 
is the harm of being placed in a particular racial category, a classifica-
tion with which he or she may not agree. 
This is a harm to individual self-definition, to the attempt to make 
sense of the world and one’s place in it.  Not many Justices recognize 
this harm, but Justice Kennedy does.  It is the  harm he identified in 
Casey, in the passage that Justice Scalia would later mock as a paean to 
“the sweet-mystery-of-life.”88  “At the heart of liberty is the right to de-
fine one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compul-
sion of the State.”89 
That Kennedy takes this concern seriously in the context of af-
firmative action is clear.  In his Parents Involved concurrence, he de-
scribed the classifications as “official labels proclaiming the race of all 
 
 85 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(stating that matters “involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 86 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711–12, 715–16. 
 87 See, e.g., id. at 742–43. 
 88 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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persons,”90 and in the oral argument expressed concern about the 
process of “characterizing each student by reason of the color of his or 
her skin.”91  More recently, in Schuette, Kennedy expressed concern 
about the project of “defin[ing] individuals according to race . . . in a 
society in which those lines are becoming more blurred . . . .”92  In 
each case, his evident concern is that racial classification by the gov-
ernment affixes a state-mandated label that may not comport with an 
individual’s self-definition.  That is an offense against the liberty in-
terest that Casey identifies. 
XVI.  THE MOST PERSISTENT DISADVANTAGE IS THE LEAST PERMISSIBLE 
TO REDRESS 
Thus far I have explained why, on the Court’s account, those who 
promote affirmative action are promoting the interests of whites, 
while those who oppose it are the true champions of racial equality.  
But there is one final proposition we may draw from the Court’s ju-
risprudence, which is somewhat at odds with the prior ones.  It is that 
the most persistent disadvantage is the least permissible to redress. 
If we look at civil rights movements of the last hundred years or 
so, there are three notable success stories:  the movements for equali-
ty based on race, on sex, and on sexual orientation.  In each instance, 
the movement initially sought to abolish unequal and oppressive 
treatment—segregated public schools,93 or less favorable social securi-
ty treatment of female wage earners,94 or criminalization of same-sex 
sexual activity.95  Following the achievement of formal equality, in 
each instance there then arose the question of whether the govern-
ment should not merely refrain from discriminating but should take 
further steps (“affirmative action”) to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination. 
The legal regime we have, which allocates strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications, intermediate scrutiny to sex-based classifications, and 
(for now) rational basis (perhaps with bite) to sexual orientation dis-
crimination, means that affirmative action for gays and lesbians 
would be easy.  For women, it would be somewhat more difficult, but 
 
 90 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 91 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-
908) (emphasis added). 
 92 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1634 (2014). 
 93 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 94 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).  
 95 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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it is possible in a relatively wide range of circumstances.96  With race, 
however, affirmative action is more difficult, and will soon likely be-
come impossible. 
This is peculiar from several perspectives, but the most important 
one is the perspective that considers the extent to which disadvantage 
is heritable.  Disadvantage based on sexual orientation discrimination 
is not heritable.  The vast majority of gays and lesbians have hetero-
sexual parents, and certainly any gay or lesbian individual has mostly 
heterosexual ancestors.  Discrimination may have reduced the wealth 
and welfare of gays and lesbians in the past, but that shortfall does 
not overhang the present generation. 
The picture is slightly different with respect to sex discrimination.  
Women who suffered discrimination in the past did hand down that 
disadvantage to their descendants; they had, for instance, less money 
to pass on to children.  But women, of course, pass that disadvantage 
down to both sons and daughters, and those sons and daughters gen-
erally also had fathers who might have benefited from the discrimina-
tion.  As far as the current generation goes, the effects of past dis-
crimination against women are distributed relatively evenly among 
men and women. 
But race is very different.  Because race is heritable in a way that 
sex and sexual orientation are not, and because interracial marriages 
have been relatively rare (though their frequency is increasing) cur-
rent minorities are quite likely to have a very high percentage of mi-
nority ancestors.  The disadvantage suffered by those ancestors, men 
and women alike, is passed down from generation to generation.97  
But this disadvantage—which does persist, which if anything com-
pounds over the years—is the one that cannot be redressed. 
Oh, well.  A small price to pay to avoid the prospect of going to a 
school that’s too good for you. 
 
 
 
 
 96 The Court has allowed women, for instance, to exclude low-income years from their 
social security calculations.  See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (finding 
that the advantages accruing to women under Social Security were the result of 
Congress’s intent to resolve economic imbalances between men and women). 
 97 For a recent attempt to calculate the magnitude of this effect, see Ta-Nehisi Coates, The 
Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 59–70. 
